Constraints
As is well known, the constraints embody the specifics of OT. They are in the same position as rules were in previous theories, yet have a broader scope than rules. They do not simply output the correct forms: they determine as well how 'good' or 'bad* the actual and possible forms are; in other words, they assign an evaluation to them. In this last respect, they are similar to the natural phonological processes of Stampe, where depending upon their application or nonapplication, the evaluation is determined (Stampe 1969 (Stampe ,1972 , as well as the markedness principles of NM (among others, Wurzel 1994:37 ff.) and the preference laws of PT (Vennemann 1988: Iff.) that deal with the direct evaluation of forms couched in terms of markedness or preferences.
1 Although these concepts have a different implementation in their respective theories (i.e., constraints filter out, phonological rules generate, markedness principles and preference laws assign a value), it should be noted that as devices computing the valuation of correct forms, they are equivalent. Thus in what follows, they will all be considered evaluation principles.
Haspelmath starts with the requirement that every individual constraint be independently motivated in order to prevent the use of ad hoc constraints found in a number of recent analyses. To this end, he attempts to lead "grammatical constraints" (that he allows a special place for) back to "user constraints" for "what is good from the point of view of the theory is good from the point of view of language users. Grammatical optimality and user optimality are largely parallel" ( § 3). This connection, he claims, has not been previously discussed "in mainstream versions [?] of OT."
2 Haspelmath assumes (and bere his own theoretical assumptions come into play) that grammatical constraints develop out of "user constraints" in a diachronic process of adaptation (more regarding this below).
I point out, however, that the connection between 'grammatical' and 'user* optimality (or naturalness/markedness) has not only been recognized for a long time, but has actually been sorted out theoretically, such that 'grammatical' optimality is identical to 'user' optimality (speaker/listener optimality). This is shown, for example, in Stampe's definition of phonological processes:
(1) "A phonological process is a mental operation that applies in speech to substitute, for a class of sounds or sound sequences presenting a specific common difficulty to the speech capacity of the individual, an alternative class identical but lacking the difficult property" (Stampe 1972: 1; emphasis mine).
In addition, also the markedness principles in NM are strictly oriented to the speaker/listener and thus in this way also grounded (Wurzel 1994: 32 if., 55ff.; 1998a) . This notion is actually not that novel; theories of grammar (at least since Chomsky 1965) have treated the grammar of a language as the grammar of the speakers/listeners of this language, and of course the universals of UG characterize the language competence of users and only this. Evaluation principles are only conceivably reasonable when oriented to the user. If one wants to adopt additional language-oriented constraints or other evaluation principles, in addition to constraints based on the speaker/listener, then very convincing reasons would be required, reasons that in this article do not become clear.
The crucial point is that every evaluation principle has to be independently justified. It is of little theoretical relevance whether these justifications should be directly incorporated into individual constraints or markedness principles (as in Haspelmath's "user constraints') or not (as in his 'grammatical constraints') and how exact a motivation for a constraint or principle has to be, for example:
(2) (i) Nasalized vowels are marked in relation to oral vowels.
(ii) Nasalized vowels are marked in relation to oral vowels, because they are more difficult to articulate. (iii) Nasalized,vowels are marked in relation to oral vowels, because they require an additional articulatory gesture for opening the velum. (and so forth).
The real issue is much more whether the predictions made by a evaluation principle are compatible with a related theory, for example whether the prediction of a phonological principle is compatible with phonetics (articulation and perception), or the predictions of a principle of morphology with semiotics (for a phonetic motivation of phonological principles, see Stampe 1969 Stampe ,1972  for semiotic motivation behind principles of morphology, see Dressier 1982 Dressier , 1985 . In this way, principles of NPh and NM are systematically explained, contrary to Haspelmath's criticism of OT ("... nobody has so far made an attempt to explain OT constraints in a systematic fashion" §2), and such an explanation functions of course in the framework of OT too.
In Haspelmath's opinion, a motivation for constraints would be irrelevant for a theory that assumes the innateness of constraints ( §2). Furthermore, he claims that the violability of the constraints would make them a poor candidate for "innate devices" ( § 7). This appears to be a misunderstanding, however if (for example) nasal vowels are said to be marked in relation to oral vowels, the motivation for this fact would presumably be based on the articulatory make-up of the human vocal tract, that oral vowels are easier to articulate than nasalized vowels. And if non-transparent complex words are more marked than transparent words, this fact would be based on the semiotic make-up of the human mind, on the basis of the fact that transparent combinations of signs are easier to perceive and compute than non-transparent signs. Both are clearly independent of a particular language. In this sense, evaluation principles are absolutely innate, but also quite explicable.
3 If constraints are to be universal but not innate, then one would have to provide an explantion as to where they might come from, as e.g. Comrie ( But what are we to make of the argument for constraint violability? This (apparent) violability comes not from the nature of the constraints themselves, but rather from the (in my opinion) generally unfortunate manner in which OT constraints are formulated. So, for example, the constraint "voiced codas are forbidden" does not really mean that voiced obstruents in codas are banned, but rather that they are less optimal or more marked than their voiceless counterparts. 4 As such, they express (like all evaluation principles) preferences and thus at the same time tendencies of language change. And statements of preferences would not be violated if forms with nonoptimal properties arise in a language.
Without a doubt one can agree with Haspelmath that language-specific constraints are impossible: "User optimality is necessarily universal" ( §3). If, however, differently structured forms are, for different languages, optimal or preferable, then this could of course be explained in many cases by a different ranking of the relevant constraints. But in fact there are cases where languages prefer certain forms that apparently cannot be justified by a universal evaluation principle. For example, there was the tendancy in Old High German (OHG) in neuter nouns that had a N./A.P1. form with category marker, to delete this marker and thus adapt to the N./A.Sg. forms (complete transition type: fazu > far, partial transition type: herzurt > herza and lembir > lamb; cf. Braune 1987: 183,187,207) , in (it should be noted) a strictly synthetic flexional system. This change won out despite running counter to the principle of constuctional iconicity (that states that the more complex concept plural should be represented by a more complex symbolization than the singular), and the principle of form-function (paradigms should symbolize different categories through different forms). The new forms thus appear simply dysfunctional. In what respect are then the new N./A.P1. forms "better" than the old ones? The answer lies in the language-specific details: the OHG neuters in their overwhelming majority show already before this change a formal correspondence between the N./A.Sg. and N./A.P1. (type wort). This correspondence can be characterized as a systemdefining structural property of OHG (Wurzel 1984:81 ff.) . The system defining structural properties are referred to by the markedness principle of system appropriateness established in the framework of NM:
A morphological form is less marked according to system-appropriateness the more it corresponds to the system-defining structural properties of the respective morphological system (Wurzel 1994:64 ff.).
This markedness principle thus favors forms that structurally and typologically fit into the appropriate morphological system. It is crucial that the markedness principle has a universal character, but that it favors forms with different properties in different languages. So this principle favors, e.g., in New High German (NHG), noun plural forms, including the neuters, that are formally distinct (without taking into account the articles) from the singular forms, due to the changes in morphological structure since OHG (cf. OHG N/A.Pl. wort, faz NHG WörterJ Worte, Fässer, but also recent developments in colloquial German such as Mädchen Mädchens, Fräulein Fräuleins). This universal markedness principle explains exactly that which the proposed, though not accepted, language-specific OT constraints attempt to explain.
Adaptation and Change
A central concept of Haspelmath's theory is that of adaptation: "Grammatical structures are adapted to the needs of users" ( § 3). This is clearly in arguable and -without reference to biology -has been known at the latest since Stampe (1969; Haspelmath cites only Croft 1990). But what does this rnpan in terms of constraints? Haspelmath asserts that the grammatical constraints "... have arisen from user constraints in a diachronic process of adaptation" ( § 8). Yet the 'grammatical' constraints of each individual language are actually (as Haspelmath emphasizes) universal. They can therefore neither emerge in individual languages (as postualted in the quote above), nor disappear from these languages, if a new generation of speakers acquire the grammatical structure of language and adapt it to their needs. There is no adaptation to the needs of the "user" available if "user constraints" of the type "coda obstruents should be pronounced voiceless in order to avoid articulatory difficulties" (a motivated constraint) are translated into "grammatical constraints" of the type "voiced coda obstruents are forbidden" (a constraint without a motivation). Even if such a translation were possible, this clearly could not lead to language change.
The situation is naturally different if one views the complete system of the constraints. In the OT framework, it is indeed plausible that individual languages and language-states differentiate themselves via different constraint rankings and that there is no universally prescribed hierarchy. This means in addition that the speaker of a language can adapt the constraint hierarchy to their user requirements during language acquisition by reranking. When they do this language change can occur. It is in this sense that one can talk (with justice) about a "diachronic process of adaptation", unlike the case for individual constraints.
3
Haspelmath's article attempts to explain language change by analogy to biological evolution through the principles of variation and selection. Haspelmath argues that the starting point of language change is variation; selection would then follow. But how does this variation occur? Obviously via change. The speakers/listeners, as the agents of language change, develop new forms that up to now have not existed. These new forms are not however created through random variation as in biology; rather, this process of formation is directional although unconsciously formed (i.e., not planned) by speakers (Wurzel 1997: 297f.; cf. Keller 1990: 181) . Change leads away from markedness. The speakers/listeners as active subjects behave economically and avoid marked structures in communication. They replace (more strongly) marked forms with unmarked/more weakly marked forms. Unlike variation in biological evolution, linguistic variation is thus created primarily by selection of new, and in a certain respect "better" forms. Grammatically initiated change (the type of change under discussion here) causes a local improvement of language structure.
6 It should also be pointed out that Haspelmath himself limits the ability of the biological model to explain language change, acknowledging "one important difference" between both: "While the source of genetic variation in biology is restricted to random mutations, the source of linguistic variation, innovation in the speech of individual speakers, is often nonrandom" ( § 5). More precisely, one must say that every grammatically initiated change is nonrandom. Given this, does one really want to claim that "linguistic change is sufficiently [!] similar to biological change"? ( §4). Indeed, what is at all accomplished given this fundamental difference between the biological paradigm and language change? 5 In Stampe's NPh, these connections are presented differently. Here (somewhat simplistically put) the speakers of a language must repress innate phonological processes or partial processes during acquisition that are not present in their language in order to arrive at the correct language norms. If they do not, then language changes. So, for example, the speakers acquiring of OHG had to (among other things) repress the process of devoicing obstruents at the syllable edge. Around the transition to Middle High German (MHG), speakers ceased to do this: e.g., OHG lob, leid, tag > MHG lop, leit, tac. The speakers of MHG have then (in Haspelmath's terms) adapted the structure of their language for this process to their "user"-needs.
6 These relationships are discussed in detail in Wurzel (1997) , where I show how the concepts of natural language change (cf. Würzet 1994), the 'invisible' hand (cf. Keller 1990) , and language economy (cf. Werner 1989) interact with each other in the explanation of language change. This paper would have been useful for Martin Haspelmath's work, since it (as his article) presents a model of language change.
Theoretically and pratically relevant, yet in large part unanswered, is the question Haspelmath poses regarding the role "social selection" plays in language change. Of course, frequently the different ranking of constraints (or in general of evaluation principles) cannot be grammatically (Haspelmath would say: functionally) explained in the individual languages. Yet here also, one should follow the old principle of the grammarians and first look for a grammatical solution before claiming that social factors are responsible for grammatical relationships. It becomes evident in many cases that the different ranking of segmental constraints in phonology is determined by different suprasegmental structures (that is, a different ranking of suprasegmental constraints). So for example in stress-timed languages like German there is a strong tendency towards reduction in unstressed syllables (cf. Wurzel 1994: 53 ff), but not, on the other hand, in syllable-timed languages like Italian; this fact is not mere coincidence (Hurch 1998: 125 
Dysfiinctionality and Contradiction
Starting from the observation that there are clearly dysfunctional aspects of language structures, Haspelmath disputes the claim that based on the language facts, one also has to accept dysfunctional OT constraints (Lightfoot 1999 and Haider 1998) . He points out that the presumed dysfiinctionality of constraints disappears when one makes a distinction between the "functional effect" and "side effect" of constraints (20 ff.). As a defense of this claim, he deploys two philosophers and one not very convincing biological argument, yet does not even mention the fact that these problems, in a general sense known as "contradictions between evaluation principles" or "conflicts of naturalness", have been a central point of discussion in linguistics for decades.
Haspelmath claims in another part of the article that constraints that are "the direct opposite" of each other, cannot be reduced to user constraints and are therefore to be excluded ( § 3). Although correct, this is only half true. In fact, constraints stand, as with evaluation principles in other theories, in many cases in contradiction to each other and necessarily so. This was systematically developed earlier by Stampe in the framework of his theory of NPh. Stampe (1969: 443 ff.) discussed the problem (among others) on the basis of the contradiction between the context-free phonological process of voicelessness of Here a famous quotation from Paul (naturally!) comes to mind, in which he ascertained many decades ago, without any reference to biology, that "Es ist eingewendet, dass es noch eine andere wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Sprache gäbe als die geschichtliche. Ich muss das in Abrede stellen ... So bald man über das blosse Konstatieren von Einzelheiten hinausgeht, sobald man versucht den Zusammenhang zu erfassen, die Erscheinungen zu begreifen, so betritt man den geschichtlichen Boden, wenn auch vielleicht ohne sich darüber klar zu sein " (1909: 20) . Of course, today not every linguist would agree with this, but there is in fact a long tradition in modern grammatical theory that starts with Kiparsky (1968: 174) : "What we really need is a window on the form of linguistic competence that is not obscured by factors like performance, about which next to nothing is known. In linguistic change we have precisely such a window". The insight that one can only pursue an explanatory theory of grammar when taking into account diachrony, has been since thirty years part and parcel of the theory of naturalness and preference and and again has been again explicitly discussed in many books and papers (especially in the work of Stampe, Vennemann and Wurzel; see the References). We can therefore welcome Martin Haspelmath on board as a new fellow combatant; a pioneer he certainly is -Q.E.D -not. And as a last note: the notion of a biological paradigm is (for this point and indeed for the entire article) in the best case in my opinion nothing more than decorative padding.
